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Journal of Business & Technology Law the seller, Minera Mexico. 9 Grupo wanted Southern Peru to purchase Minera using Southern Peru stock as consideration. 10 Since an excessive price for Minera obviously benefits Grupo at the expense of the minority shareholders of Southern Peru, Southern Peru knew at least one minority shareholder would bring a derivative action to ask a Delaware court to revisit the fairness of the price.
To protect itself from judicial oversight, Southern Peru, following a now customary practice, formed a special committee of outside directors, all able professionals, and the committee hired top-flight legal and financial advisors. 11 The financial advisor, Goldman Sachs, threw a wrench in the gears of the deal early on when it opined that Minera was worth only around 60% of the pending offering price ($3.15 billion in Southern Peru shares). 12 The Special Committee asked Goldman to go back to the drawing board to see if they could "make the deal happen." 13 Goldman did what it was asked to do, primarily by revaluing the Southern Peru stock being used as consideration for Minera. 14 Goldman found that Southern Peru's stock was not worth its then-current trading price. 15 Add a minor concession in the number of buyer shares used as consideration, some finesse in the valuing of Minera, and two shareholder voting agreements between the controlling shareholder and two large minority shareholders of Southern Peru and the deal closed at a tad under the original bid with the assent of the Special Committee (with a conflicted Committee director abstaining at the last minute). 16 Chancellor Strine did not buy Goldman Sach's revaluation and his math on the amount of liability was simple: the bid price ($3.7 billion plus) minus the value of the seller, drawing heavily on the original Goldman Sachs valuation of the seller ($2.4 billion or so), equals a judgment of $1.34 billion in damages. 17 The Court ordered the controlling shareholder, Grupo Mexico, to return to the buyer shares equal to the award and to pay attorney's fees out of the award equal to 15% of the amount. There is much to say about this case. One could chew on the Special Committee authorization resolution, 19 the summary judgment for the independent directors, the problematic shareholder agreements, 20 the compensation of plaintiff's attorneys, 21 the refusal to redress the fiasco that is the Lynch case, 22 or the corporate governance provisions that "topped up" the value of the seller. 23 Of these, the most notable is the incongruity of the purported legal innocence of the members of the Special Committee, given that the Committee's actions were deplorable and subjected the company and the other directors, including those not on the Committee and whose acts were not in issue, to massive liability.
However Vice Chancellor Laster gave a thoughtful discussion of four cognitive biases evident in the Special Committee's decision-making: anchoring (estimates based on a known starting value), framing (the effect of framing alternatives as gains rather than losses, for example), confirmation (seeking out information that validates existing views), and groupthink (the desire to promote harmony and avoid dissent). 27 Of the four, he is most critical of the board's groupthink problems.
28
He could have added another form of bias, equally important and supplemental to the groupthink bias, namely that of misplaced loyalty to authority. Path-breaking work in empirical social psychology by Professor Stanley Milgram in the late 1960s, 29 reinforced by decades of studies, has shown that loyalty is hardwired in human behavior and loyalty to an authority figure can easily suppress even the strongest ethical standards (misplaced loyalty).
30
Misplaced loyalty to an authority figure is a recurring theme in many disastrous business decisions. 31 Corporate officers and directors, who should have known better, put loyalty to a dynamic leader (i.e. the CEO or controlling shareholder) above duty to shareholders and even, occasionally, obedience to the law. The officers and directors of Enron and Worldcom who were not active in the basic financial frauds but passively approved them easily come to mind. 32 Groupthink, combined with blindly bowing to authority, is a potent and vile brew for all directors, inside and out, who passively follow the lead of a controlling CEO.
27. Laster, supra note 24, at 4-6. Scholarship over the last forty years in cognitive science, social psychology and behavioral economics has created an evolving list of cognitive biases. the phenomena. An experimenter was able to demand subjects to deliver a series of increasing electric shocks to a "student," played by an actor. In reality there were no shocks, but the actor played the part, reacting more negatively as subjects delivered, on order, higher levels of current for student "mistakes." Sixty-five percent of the subjects delivered the highest level of current (a massive pretend 450 volt shock) even with the student banging on the wall and complaining about a heart condition. 
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A number of writers in different professions have suggested that decision making groups need procedural safeguards against groupthink and/or misplaced loyalty. 33 Inevitably most of the writers tentatively propose, among other things, a devil's advocate procedure. This suggestion is found frequently in papers discussing particularly the decision-making of corporate boards of directors. 34 Vice Chancellor Laster's speech is yet another example. 35 Some of the writers suggest that the "independent" director requirements for modern publicly-traded company boards or that pressure for "diversity" on boards are but a diluted form of this devil's advocate procedure. 36 We expect (or hope?) independent (or "diverse") directors will act as devil's advocates in important corporate matters.
A "devil's advocate" is someone assigned to take a position opposite the prevailing view to stimulate argument.
37
Of the myriad solutions to misplaced loyalty, the devil's advocate procedure is the most crystalline: it is straightforward to implement and easy to spot. Many of the other solutions are "softer," mushy intentions that are closer to aspirational goals than hard-cut processes. 38 There are also variations: a devil's advocate can be a permanent position in the group, assigned by issue or topic, or fixed by position in the discussion.
39
This argument for a devil's advocate bears a very close look. Should boards implement a devil's advocate procedure to help them satisfy an "entire fairness" review? Or even a business judgment (gross negligence) review? Unfortunately, empirical research does not cooperate. Studies show that a devil's advocate is only marginally effective in combating the problem of groupthink. 40 By far the preferred alternative is to have a real, rather than a pretend, dissenter on the board to promote creative problem-solving. So we are back to what we all intuitively know in the first place: you need a "shit on the board" (SOB), someone who asks the tough questions of the CEO. Again, Vice Chancellor Laster agrees.Unfortunately, this is hazardous duty as research shows. 41 Dissenting directors are not rewarded with career boosts; they often lose their board seats and when they do, they do not get rewarded with new board seats elsewhere. 42 So as we often say, and I am paraphrasing: "Dissent must be its own reward."
Or must it? There are certain, special CEOs who nurture dissent on their boards. They are easy to spot. Consider the column of Lucy Kellaway in the Financial Times. On a airplane, she sat next to a woman who chairs several companies and who declared "I always make sure that there is one shit on each of my boards." 43 Ms. 
44
Her short piece is worth reading in full as are the online comments. Some commentators make the obvious point that the SOB cannot be the CEO or the Chair, for example. 45 Others remind us that a feuding, squabbling board is a disaster. 46 A board does have serious work to do and a perpetual grump on the board can delay and obscure, drive deals outside the board meeting, and, in extreme cases, engender outright hostility and deadlock.
It is evident that (1) there is a "sweet spot" in terms of degree of board dissent; and more importantly, (2) an overly collegial board subject to groupthink and misguided loyalty is a far more normal state of affairs and a far bigger risk than the occasional dysfunctional, squabbling board. I suggest that many CEO's, reading the extensive literature on cooperation (niceness), have it backwards; they should take care to nurture dissent not collegiality. Collegiality and obedience to authority come easy to boards. Disagreement comes hard and the CEO must encourage and support it.
Unfortunately the tricks of structured role playing that are the stock in trade of class room psychologists are probably of limited usefulness. In the end, the openness to dissent ought not to take the form of artificial devil's advocate procedures, nor the form of appointing dyed in the wool grumps or cynics. It should consist of an atmosphere or culture in which capable, thoughtful people are encouraged to speak their mind whenever they disagree with or are otherwise hesitant to follow the CEO's recommended course of action, in which those same people are thanked rather than penalized for their candor, and in which people who do not actively participate in adding serious thought to a discussion on difficult decisions are not welcome on the board.
Small groups that operate with a healthy respect for dissent are not hard to spot. A moment's observation by a savvy, experienced outsider can distinguish, for example, a law faculty that defers passively to the dean's recommendations from one that respects a dean's request but deliberates thoughtfully on its consequences. I have no doubt that boards of directors could be similarly judged.
In any event, could judges take evidence on board dynamics in their analysis of board decisions? If a judge can spot the biases, surely experts could testify on board procedure as well. This suggestion would no doubt cause Vice Chancellor Laster to recoil in horror: "I am not advocating that!" He was merely explaining how a good
